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The Bad Fruit of a Bad Policy.

Nothing could better illustrate the manner in which a bad policy always continues to bring forth evil fruit than the extermination of a band of six hundred Moros on Mt. Dago, Philippine Islands, in a three days' fight in early March, by the American troops and Philippine constabulary under General Wood. The details of the melancholy event have been given in all the daily papers, and our readers have only to draw upon their imaginations to have the repulsive picture before them.

It is creditable to the people of the country that this performance has been nearly universally condemned, and has occasioned a volume of indignant protest, from one end of the country to the other, such as has not often been witnessed. Instead of regarding it as "a brilliant feat of arms," adding to the honor of the American army, the common sentiment of the nation, regardless of party affiliations, shocked at the promiscuous slaughter of six hundred men, with women and children, has seen the ghastly event in its true light, and has faithfully characterized it as a "massacre," an "inexcusable butchery," which has disgraced the whole land. Those who have attempted to justify it have been comparatively few, and they have shown little heart in what they have had to say.

Even from the point of view of the severest military necessity it is fairly open to question whether any tenable excuse can be made for such a wholesale slaughter. It is quite inconceivable that no prisoners could have been taken from a body of six hundred men, whatever kind of resistance they may have put up, if there had been any real wish to take them; or that wounded men who had tried to kill those rendering aid could not have been, some of them, at any rate, disarmed and carried away as prisoners. These Moros may have been bandits and marauders, raiding those who were friendly to the American dominion. They probably were so, in some sense of those terms. General Wood gives this and the fact that they resisted unto death as the grounds for the action of his force in killing all of them. But even under these circumstances, with the added excuse that they were religious fanatics glad to die at the hands of "Christians," it is beyond belief that none of them could have been taken alive, or half alive, by a brave and disciplined American army.

It looks *prima facie*, therefore, as if Generals Wood and Bliss went in with the deliberate purpose of extermination, or developed this purpose as the battle progressed, as the easiest method of getting rid of these troublesome people, who have persisted from the beginning in being enemies of American sovereignty. All his later explanations only add to this conviction. If this be true, — as we hope for the sake of the country's reputation is not the case,— in what terms can the deed be properly characterized?

But if the shooting and stabbing to death of these Moros to the last man can be justified by military necessity, as the attempt has been made to justify it, the blackness and shame of the deed are not thereby one whit lessened. It is only another proof of the inherent cruelty and inhumanity of the method of brute force, of its unfitness to survive in an age of increasing love of justice, humaneness and active effort to save and elevate men of all classes. It is a method uncontrolled, in the last analysis, by any moral principle. It is without the element of mercy, without conscience, without reason. It knows no law but might, before which human beings that come in its way are crushed to death if they cannot otherwise be overcome. The pacification which it produces is the pacification of death and the tomb.

It may be doubted whether, after all, those who have supported the government's Philippine policy can with any real consistency criticise this slaughter

of Mt. Dago, as some have done. Was it not, considering the character of the people, an inevitable fruit of the forcible annexation of the islands, involving as that did the subjugation by force of any who might oppose our self-assumed dominion? We all remember only too well to what wholesale slaughters and desolations the policy led in the early days of our possession. The Mt. Dago affair is of a piece with the others, a little more concentrated and intense, it is true, but not in any essential respect different.

But what shall be said of the moral quality of a policy which leads inevitably to such monstrous inhumanities? Can the policy be made to justify the crimes to which it gives birth, or do not rather the crimes overwhelmingly condemn the policy and demand its immediate abandonment? And what shall be said of the virtue of a great nation great in its constitution and in the ordinary moral grandeur of its people — which persists in following: the logic of a bad policy even into the commission of the barbarities of the most barbarous ages? great nation like ours ought to have found some nobler method of dealing with a backward people, or body of peoples, like the Filipinos, than that which has resulted in this late wholesale killing of a whole tribe of them. The nation itself must bear the infamy of the deed, whoever did the commanding and the shooting, for the nation is responsible for the policy which led straight to its accomplishment. We cannot wash our hands of the stain, on the plea that we did not ascend to the crater of the mountain and do the bloody, dreadful work. poor, brave soldiers who climbed the hills at the command of their leader will never be able to forget the awful scene which their hands produced. Nor ought we to get it out of our thoughts until it has brought us under the sackcloth and ashes of a genuine national repentance.

Leonard Courtney on Britain's Duty in Reference to Armaments.

The question of a limitation and reduction of armaments is at the front in British politics, and is sure to stay there. The new Prime Minister in his opening campaign speech recognized this fact, and emphasized it by the positive ground which he took in favor of adjusting the armaments to modern conditions. It becomes more and more clear as the new government advances with its program that this is the central task with which it will have to deal, if it meets the demands imposed upon it by the conditions of the country and the mandate of the electors.

In a notable speech at Oxford on the 10th of March, Mr. Leonard Courtney declared that the country would judge the new Liberal Ministry by its success or failure in delivering the people from the enormous burdens of the present military and naval expenditures. The *Manchester Guardian* declares that this is no exaggeration; that the task is not one that the Government may or may not attempt according to its convenience; that it must do this duty in order to have at its command the means with which to carry out the social reforms on which the country has set its heart.

Mr. Courtney declared that the passage in the Prime Minister's Albert Hall speech in which he had expressed the hope that Great Britain might place itself at the head of an international league of peace for the purpose of arresting and reducing armaments, "had echoed and re-echoed all over the country." He might have added that it had echoed and re-echoed all over the world. For the new British Ministry represents not the Liberal Party of England alone, but also the vast progressive sentiment in all lands which looks with revived hope to the initiative of the new British Parliament for deliverance from the growing curse of militarism. This foreign constituency, which is very large and influential, will support to the utmost the British Government in whatever measures it may propose toward reduction of armaments through a peace league of the nations. But it will also be just as swift in its condemnation as the British people, if there is hesitancy to undertake this urgent task.

Mr. Courtney warned the new Government against the peril of accepting things as the late Ministry had left them, of continuing the cry of "imminent enemies," against whom they must be prepared. The great problem before the Government was not that of a well-managed War Office and an efficient army at the smallest cost; it was how to establish their relations with other countries, to show others what they meant by reduction of armaments.

The finest passage in Mr. Courtney's address was that in which he urged the nation to show courage in facing the risk, "the glorious risk," of reduced armaments. It was as follows:

"I want to invite others by our example. I want a little courage in facing the risks of reduced armaments. Are you prepared to run that risk? There is always some risk that you may be attacked. There is some element of truth in the descriptions put before you of the temper of particular statesmen and the aims of particular governments. The question is whether you are prepared to combat that temper and to meet those aims by action, by showing confidence that in the righteousness of our cause we have a greater defense than can be found in enlarged armaments, and that in the matter of military preparation, as in the matter of free trade, we had better not wait for the cooperation of other nations, but must run the glorious risk of leading the way. I do not wish in the slightest degree to deny the existence of risks, but I confess for my part that I am tired of the